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THE CONSTITUTIONAL




An alarming injustice of the American legal system is the way
in which courts dismiss many pneumoconiosis (black lung) ap-
peals because the petitioner fails to conform with procedural
guidelines. Nowhere is this problem more acute than in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which in-
cludes the coal-rich mountains of Kentucky and Tennessee.1
Black lung claims represent a staggering drain on the Sixth
Circuit's docket. In one form or another, approximately one
hundred cases come before the court annually.2 The majority of
these cases are filed by a disabled claimant or the claimant's
widow, proceeding pro se.3 Each case presents a story of human
struggle against both a crippling disease and a system mired in
bureaucracy. Aggrieved parties write of the inability to breathe,4
* Associate at Bingham, Dana & Gould, Boston, Mass. B.A., University of Toledo,
1983; M.A., The Ohio State University, 1985; J.D., Boston College, 1988. Law Clerk to
The Honorable George C. Edwards, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
1988-89. The author thanks Professor Mark S. Brodin of Boston College Law School,
The Honorable George C. Edwards, Darlene Koenig, Esq. and Ms. Sally A. Michaels for
their assistance in the formative stages of this Article.
1. The Sixth Circuit includes the states of Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee.
The court sits in Cincinnati, Ohio, and is presently composed of 14 active and 6 senior
judges. For a discussion of the court, see JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
BICENTENNIAL COMMITTEE, HISTORY OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT (1976). Because the appeals
must be filed in the circuit where the injury allegedly occurred, the Sixth Circuit has
many filings, given the location of the mining industry.
2. Memorandum from William M. Eggemeier, Sixth Circuit System Manager, to
Darlene Koenig, Staff Attorney (October 6, 1988) (discussing black lung cases filed in the
twelve month period ending June 30, 1988) (on file with the UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
JOURNAL OF LAW REFORM). Nationwide, black lung disputes have reached such an epi-
demic level that a case reporter digest, the Black Lung Reporter (BLR), is now being
published.
3. Of the 40 black lung appeals filed by claimants in the Sixth Circuit from April
through September, 1988, 27 were filed by pro se parties. Id. Memorandum from William
M. Eggemeier to Darlene Koenig, supra note 2.
4. Collins v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs [hereinafter
OWCP], No. 88-3430 (6th Cir. filed May 18, 1988), dismissed (June 26, 1988). Many of
the cases cited in this Article are unpublished decisions or dismissals. Copies of all cited
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to walk over one hundred feet at a time,5 or to take care of
[themselves].' A wife may write of a spouse whose lung hemor-
rhages,7 a husband who "just smothers so bad,"8 and wanting to
"give up" her own life so that her husband might live.' This
compelling human drama is exacerbated by the dismissal of
these cases on appeal prior to the court even considering the
merits of the claim for benefits.
In the most recent period for which accurate records are avail-
able, April 1, 1988 to September 30, 1988, twenty seven pro se
pneumoconiosis appeals were docketed in the Sixth Circuit. Of
those twenty seven appeals, only seven were free of procedural
defects. The pro se litigants' misunderstanding of the black lung
dispute process causes the defects in their appeals and the resul-
tant court of appeals dismissal of those appeals.
Part I of this Article explains the statutory requirements that
a black lung benefits claimant must meet and how these claim-
ants' failure to meet statutory prerequisites results in the dis-
missal of their claims. Part II argues that the current procedures
are inadequate to protect the rights of black lung benefits claim-
ants. Dismissal of their claims violates the petitioners' rights to
due process of law and pro se representation. Part III proposes
two solutions to the crisis. The first proposal is simply a form
that would be distributed to all claimants explaining the proce-
dures they must follow to avoid dismissal. Part III presents such
a form. The second solution is the liberal interpretation of the
statutory guidelines through the doctrine of constructive filing.
Part IV concludes that the crisis calls for immediate attention
and the implementation of one of the two proposed solutions.
appeals and opinions not officially published are on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform.
5. Woods v. OWCP, No. 88-3608 (6th Cir. filed Aug. 3, 1988), dismissed (Oct. 26,
1988).
6. Kington v. Zeigler Coal Co., No. 88-3661 (6th Cir. filed July 25, 1988), dismissed
(Aug. 16, 1988).
7. Crawford v. Shamrock Coal Co., No. 88-3883 (6th Cir. filed Sept. 27, 1988), dis-
missed (Oct. 4, 1988) (The court subsequently heard the appeal and affirmed the denial
of benefits. See 881 F.2d 1075 (1989)).
8. Fairchild v. OWCP, No. 88-3705 (6th Cir. filed Aug. 8, 1988), dismissed (Oct. 18,
1988).
9. Torok v. OWCP, No. 88-3781 (6th Cir. filed Aug. 29, 1988), dismissed (Oct. 21,
1988).
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I. BLACK LUNG CLAIMS AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
A. The Background of Black Lung Benefits
Pneumoconiosis is a devastating disease, afflicting "hundreds
of thousands of coal miners who have spent their entire working
lives inhaling coal dust."'" The coal dust causes the lining of the
lung to harden." This leads to the formation of dust-encrusted
nodules in the lobes of the lungs, resulting in a host of lung dis-
eases, including cancer, chronic asthma, and emphysema.
Prompted by the severity of the black lung problem, Congress
enacted four interdependent statutes protecting the nation's
coal miners. 2
10. Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 109 S. Ct. 414, 425 (1988) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
11. Technically, pneumoconiosis includes other inhalation-induced lung diseases,
such as asbestosis. However, in the context of this Article, "pneumoconiosis" is used for
its more common meaning, "black lung." See Definition of Pneumoconiosis 20 C.F.R.
§ 718.201 (1988). For a discussion of the disease and its cause and effects, see Hatch,
Pneumoconiosis, in 8 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE & SURGERY 226, 231-32 (P. Cantor ed. 1962);
DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1073 (23d ed. 1957).
12. These statutes are:
(a) Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742
(1969) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-945 (1982)). This act was redesignated
as the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 by Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290
(1977). For legislative history, see 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2503.
(b) Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95 (1978)
(codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1982)).
(c) Black Lung Benefits Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-119, 95 Stat. 1643 (codi-
fied as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1982)).
(d) Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1982),
amended by the Longshore & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-426, 98 Stat. 1654 (1984) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-948
(Supp. V 1987)). This act, and particularly § 921(b), which governs the Benefits Review
Board, are brought into the Black Lung Statutes by reference. 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (1982).
For law review articles discussing the black lung statutes and related issues, see gener-
ally.McElveen & Postol, Compensating Occupational Disease Victims Under the Long-
shoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 717 (1983); Postol,
The Federal Solution to Occupational Disease Claims-The Longshore Act and Pro-
posed Federal Programs, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 199 (1986); Rabin, Environmental Liability
and the Tort System, 24 Hous. L. REv. 27 (1987); Ramsey & Habermann, The Federal
Black Lung Program-The View from the Top, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 575 (1985); Solomons, A
Critical Analysis of the Legislative History Surrounding the Black Lung Interim Pre-
sumptions and a Survey of its Unresolved Issues, 83 W. VA. L. REV. 869 (1981); Volz,
Medical and Health Issues in Coal Arbitration, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 725 (1987). In addi-
tion, the Supreme Court has addressed the black lung benefits program in three princi-
ple cases: Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 109 S. Ct. 414 (1988) (discussing 30 U.S.C.
§ 902(f)(2) of the 1977 Reform Act); Mullins Coal Co. v. OWCP, 484 U.S. 135 (1987)
(discussing regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
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Congress passed the first of the four statutes, the Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act, in 1969.'" Title IV of the Act es-
tablished a federal black lung benefits program for coal miners
who are totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis. It also provided
for benefits to the surviving dependents of miners killed by the
disease. 4
The Black Lung Benefit Reform Act of 1977 (1977 Reform
Act),' 5 the first major change in black lung benefits, expanded
the definition of miner to include "any individual who works or
has worked in or around a coal mine or coal preparation facility
in the extraction or preparation of coal."'" At the same time that
Congress passed the 1977 Reform Act, it enacted the Black Lung
Benefits Revenue Act of 1977,' 7 establishing the Black Lung
Disability Trust Fund (Trust Fund).' 8 An excise tax on each ton
of coal sold, paid by coal producers, finances the Trust Fund.' 9
The most recent substantive changes affecting the black lung
benefits program are the Black Lung Benefits Amendments of
1981 (1981 Amendments).2" The 1981 Amendments make it
more difficult for a miner to establish eligibility for disability
benefits." The 1981 Amendments also remove the provision al-
lowing survivors' entitlement to benefits based on the miners'
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding constitutionality of the Black Lung Benefits
Act of 1972).
13. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-945 (1982).
14. Id. at § 901. This Act liberalized the basic provisions for black lung benefits. The
first significant amendment to Title IV was the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 153 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-936 (1982)). The
changes included: (1) expanding the statutory definition of "total disability"; (2) ex-
tending the coverage of Title IV to surface miners; and (3) expanding the definition of
"dependent."
15. 30 U.S.C. § 902 (1982).
16. Id. at § 902(d).
17. 26 U.S.C. § 4121 (1982).
18. 26 U.S.C. § 9501 (1982).
19. 26 U.S.C. § 4121 (1982).
20. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1982). After 1973, employees are covered by state workers'
compensation laws, 30 U.S.C. § 931 (1982), the United States Secretary of Labor, 30
U.S.C. § 925(a)(1) (1982), or by a black lung insurance program administered by the
federal government. 30 U.S.C. § 943 (1982).
21. The 1981 Amendment repealed three of five presumptions in the earlier law that
were based on the duration of mine employment: the 10 year presumption of § 411(c)(2),
30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(2) (1982); the 15 year presumption of § 411(c)(4), 30 U.S.C.
§ 921(c)(4) (1982); and the 25 year presumption of § 411(c)(5), 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(5)
(1982). The presumption was a presumptive entitlement to benefits upon submission of
X-ray, biopsy or autopsy evidence which established the existence of pneumoconiosis,
and upon showing either the requisite term of mining service or that the impairment
arose out of coal mine employment. See Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 109 S. Ct. 414,
417-18 (1988).
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total disability22 due to pneumoconiosis at the time of death.
The Act now requires that a survivor's entitlement be based on
the miner's death due to pneumoconiosis. '3
This web of statutes requires the petitioner to file the initial
claim for benefits at any of the district offices of the Social Se-
curity Administration or the Department of Labor.24 These of-
fices forward the claim to the Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs (OWCP) where it is filed with the deputy commis-
sioner, who oversees the development of all evidence related to
the case.25 If the evidence does not support the claim, the peti-
tioner has opportunities to submit new evidence and receives a
hearing before the deputy commissioner. 2 After the hearing, the
deputy commissioner prepares a stipulation of issues and a pro-
posed order. 7 If issues are still disputed by the petitioners or
the operator, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) reviews the
decision. 8 The ALJ possesses the power to develop evidence,
but may adjudicate only the issues delineated by the deputy
commissioner or issues not "reasonably ascertainable" by the
parties at the time the claim was before the deputy commis-
sioner.29 The ALJ then must decide whether the evidence indi-
cates: (1) the existence of pneumoconiosis 3 and (2) total disabil-
ity.3" She denies benefits if the claimant fails to meet both
standards.32 Either party can appeal the ALJ's decision to the
22, The term "total disability" is defined in 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(b) (1988). A miner is
considered "totally disabled" if pneumoconiosis prevents or prevented the miner:
(1) From performing his or her usual coal mine work; and
(2) From engaging in gainful employment in the immediate area of his or her
residence requiring the skills or abilities comparable to those of any employment
in a mine or mines in which he or she previously engaged with some regularity
over a substantial period of time.
20 C.F.R. § 718.204(b)(1)-(2) (1988). This section also provides that a miner be consid-
ered "totally disabled" if he is diagnosed as suffering from chronic dust disease in accor-
dance with 20 C.F.R. § 718.304 (1988),
23. 30 U.S.C. § 901 (1982).
24. 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.303-725.305 (1988). The claim must be in writing.
25. 20 C.F.R. § 725.410 (1988).
26. 20 C.F.R. § 725.417 (1988).
27. 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.417, 725.421 (1988).
28. 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.419, 725.421, 725.450, 725.451 (1988). The rules of practice and
procedure before the AU are codified at 29 C.F.R. § 18 (1988).
29. 20 C.F.R. § 725.463 (1988).
30. 20 C.F.R. § 718.202 (1988).
31. 20 C.F.R. § 718.204 (1988).
32. See Crawford v. Shamrock Coal Co., No. 88-3883 (6th Cir. filed Sept. 27 1988),
dismissed (Oct. 4, 1988).
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Benefits Review Board (BRB) of the Department of Labor."
The Board will affirm the ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions
of law if they are supported by substantial evidence, are "ra-
tional," and accord with applicable law.s4 The decision of the
BRB can be appealed to the United States court of appeals for
the state in which the black lung injury allegedly occurred. 5 The
court reviews the BRB's decisions for errors of fact and law.
36
If the black lung benefits process appears straightforward to
practitioners, why are so many cases dismissed? The answer is
simple: no "appeal guidelines" are provided to pro se black lung
claimants. In contrast, the government regularly supplies ap-
peal guidelines to claimants in cases involving social security
benefits. 38 The social security benefits form is a standardized
33. 33 U.S.C. § 921(b) (1982). The ALJ issues a written decision, including findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and an order. 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.476, 725.477 (1988). The Rules
and Regulations governing the BRB are found at 20 C.F.R. §§ 801, 802 (1988).
34. 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (1982), 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3) (1982). See generally, O'Keefe v.
Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Assocs., 380 U.S. 359 (1965); Frederick v. OWCP, 808 F.2d
813 (11th Cir. 1987).
35. 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) (1982). The federal district court thus has no jurisdiction over
the merits of black lung litigation. Its jurisdiction is limited to enforcement of any order
made by the BRB. Thompson v. Potashnick Constr. Co., 812 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1987).
36. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. OWCP, 812 F.2d 518, 525 (9th Cir. 1987).
37. The BRB or the ALJ occasionally provides both attorneys and pro se claimants
with a partial list of appellate procedures on an ad hoc basis. Of the 40 cases filed with
the Sixth Circuit from April 1, 1988 to September 30, 1988 six received one of two types
of post hoc notice. It is clear, however, that the practice is neither standard nor
mandatory, and the quality of the notice provided in the forms varied among the six
cases.
In five of the cases, the post hoc notice was provided to the claimant by the clerk of
the BRB, in the form of a letter, after the claimant had mistakenly mailed the appeal to
the Board. See Fairchild v. OWCP, 863 F.2d 17 (6th Cir. 1988) (petition mailed to BRB
Feb. 23, 1988; BRB returned it to petitioner May 13, 1988); Reffitt v. OWCP, No. 88-
3586 (6th Cir. filed July 6, 1988), dismissed (Oct. 20, 1988) (petition mailed to BRB Feb.
22, 1988; BRB returned it to petitioner June 22, 1988); Godsey v. OWCP, No. 88-3582
(6th Cir. filed July 1, 1988), dismissed (Oct. 20, 1988) (petition mailed to BRB Mar. 2,
1988; BRB returned it to petitioner May 16, 1988); Reed v. OWCP, No. 88-3453 (6th Cir.
filed May 26, 1988), dismissed (Aug. 15, 1988) (petition mailed to BRB Jan. 8, 1988;
BRB returned it to petitioner May 16, 1988); Gilkerson v. OWCP, No. 88-3452 (6th Cir.
filed May 26, 1988), dismissed (June 23, 1988) (petition mailed to BRB June 2, 1987;
BRB returned it to petitioner May 16, 1988). In all five cases, the notice was mailed to
the claimant 60-300 days after the BRB received the request for an appeal. The form of
the letters is virtually identical, and informs the claimant that the BRB has "no jurisdic-
tion to consider your request for an appeal."
The sixth case involved a letter sent by the clerk of courts for the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals. See Crawford v. Shamrock Coal Co., No. 88-3883 (6th Cir. filed Sept. 27,
1988), dismissed (Oct. 4, 1988). In his letter, the clerk informed the claimant's wife that
her husband must sign and return the petition for review.
38. See, e.g., the standard printed form advising an unsuccessful social security
claimant of the appeals procedure, reprinted in Blankenship v. Secretary HHS, 858 F.2d
1188, 1191 n.1 (6th Cir. 1988).
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preprinted sheet listing all of the deadlines for filing appeals.39
The form describes the place for filing in detail. Blanks are left
for the claimant's name and address, and the ALJ attaches the
form to the front of the decision. The packet of papers is then
mailed to the claimant, who may subsequently pursue the
proper means of appeal.
Black lung litigants have not been so fortunate. The govern-
ment provides them with no "notice" or "warning" sheet in the
event of an adverse ALJ or BRB decision. Without such guid-
ance, they must guess at the proper appellate procedure.40 Con-
sequently, many of the litigants commit gross procedural errors
that result in the dismissal of their cases. The most frequent
procedural defects are:
(1) filing the appeal directly with the BRB instead of the
U.S. court of appeals,41
(2) the claimant's failure to sign the appeal,42 and
(3) the claimant's appeal is not timely.43
39. See 20 C.F.R. § 725.417 (1988).
40. This is against the spirit of the law. Congress notes in the Black Lung Benefits
Reform Act that "[i]ndividual assistance in preparing and processing claims shall be of-
fered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of Labor and
provided to potential beneficiaries." 30 U.S.C. § 904 (1982).
41. See, e.g., Torok v. OWCP, No. 88-3781 (6th Cir. filed Aug. 29, 1988), dismissed
(Oct. 21, 1988); Norris v. Peabody Coal Co., No. 88-3885 (6th Cir. filed Aug. 22, 1988),
dismissed (Feb. 22, 1989); Fairchild v. OWCP, 863 F.2d 17 (6th Cir. 1988); Woods v.
OWCP, No. 88-3690 (6th Cir. filed Aug. 3, 1988), dismissed (Oct. 26, 1988); Thompson v.
OWCP, No. 88-3663 (6th Cir. filed July 25, 1988), dismissed (Aug. 16, 1988); Kington v.
Ziegler Coal, No. 88-3661 (6th Cir. filed July 25, 1988), dismissed (Aug. 6, 1988); McLain
v. OWCP, No. 88-3602 (6th Cir. filed July 8, 1988), dismissed (Oct. 5, 1988); Reffitt v.
OWCP, No. 88-3586 (6th Cir. filed July 6, 1988), dismissed (Oct. 20, 1988); Partin v.
OWCP, No. 88-3585 (6th Cir. filed July 5, 1988), dismissed (Nov. 7, 1988); Godsey v.
OWCP, No. 88-3582 (6th Cir. filed July 1, 1988), dismissed (Oct. 20, 1988); Reed v.
OWCP, No. 88-3453 (6th Cir. filed May 26, 1988), dismissed (Aug. 15, 1988); Collins v.
OWCP, No. 88-3430 (6th Cir. filed May 18, 1988), dismissed (June 26, 1988).
42. See, e.g., Crawford v. Shamrock Coal Co., No. 88-3883 (6th Cir. filed Sept. 27,
1988), dismissed (Oct. 4, 1988); Woods v. OWCP, No. 88-3690 (6th Cir. filed Aug. 29,
1988); Torok v. OWCP, No. 88-3781 (6th Cir. filed Aug. 29, 1988) dismissed (Oct. 21
1988); Norris v. Peabody Coal, No. 88-3885 (6th Cir. filed Aug. 22, 1988) dismissed (Feb.
22, 1989); Kington v. Ziegler Coal, No. 88-3661 (6th Cir. filed July 25, 1988).
43. Collett v. OWCP, No. 88-3455 (6th Cir. filed May 20, 1988), dismissed (Aug. 15,
1988); Fairchild v. OWCP, 863 F.2d 17 (6th Cir. 1988).
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B. The Procedural Defects That Result in Dismissal
1. Filing the appeal with the BRB- Understandably, many
unsuccessful claimants file their "notice of appeal" or "appeal
petition," which is usually a handwritten one or two paragraph
letter pleading for relief,44 with the BRB instead of with the
United States court of appeals as statutorily required. As dis-
cussed above, the appeals procedure in black lung cases has
many steps, going from ALJ to BRB, and finally to the United
States Court of Appeals. For attorneys it may be straightfor-
ward; but for lay people it is difficult to follow. Moreover, from
the pro se claimant's point of view, the BRB denied the appeal
from the ALJ. Why wouldn't the BRB also hear the appeal from
its own decision?
Unfortunately, a letter of appeal to the BRB often proves fa-
tal to the petitioner's claim. The BRB often will not return the
appeal to the claimant with instructions to file it with the court
of appeals until the sixty day appeal period for black lung claims
has lapsed.45 In such cases, no matter how sympathetic the
cause, the court of appeals must dismiss the appeal as
untimely.4"
2. The failure of the claimant to sign the appeal petition-
Sufficiency of the notice of appeal constitutes the second ground
upon which courts dismiss pro se claimants' appeals before
reaching the merits.47 As previously noted, these notices of ap-
peal are often simply letters describing the debilitating effects of
pneumoconiosis."I Problems arise when the claimant fails to per-
44. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Fairchild v. OWCP, No. 88-3705 (6th Cir. filed Aug. 8, 1988) (petition
mailed to BRB Feb. 23, 1988; BRB returned it to petitioner May 13, 1988); Reffitt v.
OWCP, No. 88-3586 (6th Cir. filed July 6, 1988), dismissed (Oct. 20, 1988) (petition
mailed to BRB Feb. 22, 1988; BRB returned it to petitioner June 22, 1988); Godsey v.
OWCP, No. 88-3582 (6th Cir. filed July 1, 1988), dismissed (Oct. 20, 1988) (petition
mailed to BRB Mar. 2, 1988; BRB returned it to petitioner May 16, 1988); Reed v.
OWCP, No. 88-3453 (6th Cir. filed May 26, 1988), dismissed (Aug. 15, 1988) (petition
mailed to BRB Jan. 8, 1988; BRB returned it to petitioner May 16, 1988); Gilkerson v.
OWCP, No. 88-3452 (6th Cir. filed May 26, 1988), dismissed (June 23, 1988) (petition
mailed to BRB June 3, 1987; BRB returned it to petitioner May 16, 1988).
46. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), 25(a).
47. See, e.g., Torok v. OWCP, No. 88-3781 (6th Cir. filed Aug. 29, 1988), dismissed
(Oct. 21, 1988) (petitioner did not sign and petition mailed to BRB instead of Sixth
Circuit); Norris v. Peabody Coal Co., No. 88-3885 (6th Cir. filed Aug. 22, 1988), dis-
missed (Feb. 22, 1989) (petitioner did not sign and petition mailed to BRB instead of
Sixth Circuit); Woods v. OWCP, No. 88-3690 (6th Cir. filed Aug. 3, 1988), dismissed
(Oct. 26, 1988) (petitioner did not sign and petition mailed to BRB instead of Sixth
Circuit).
48. See supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
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sonally sign the form that a spouse or child prepares. In almost
all the defective cases, the claimant's spouse or child signs the
form, invariably resulting in the dismissal of a pneumoconiosis
appeal.4
II. THE ILLEGALITY OF THE CURRENT PNEUMOCONIoSIs APPEALS
PROCESS
A. A Brief Overview of Procedural Due Process
The fifth amendment to the Constitution provides that a per-
son cannot be deprived of life, liberty, or property without "due
process of law."' 50 Similarly, the fourteenth amendment states
that no "State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law."51 As Professor Laurence Tribe
has pointed out, "[tihese procedural safeguards have their his-
torical origins in the notion that conditions of personal freedom
can be preserved only when there is some institutional check on
arbitrary government action."52 Those historical origins extend
back to the Magna Carta.
5 3
One aspect of the due process notion is procedural due pro-
cess, which concerns the limitations that the Constitution places
on the judicial, executive, and administrative functions of our
governments-state and federal. Procedural due process raises
the question of what process or procedure the government owes
a person before the government takes actions that affect that
person's "life, liberty, or property." As Justice Frankfurter wrote
in 1951:
No better instrument has been devised for arriving at
truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss no-
tice of the case against him and an opportunity to meet
49. As the Sixth Circuit noted in its October 4, 1988 Order dismissing the appeal of
the claimant in Crawford v. Shamrock Oil Co., "'[Plarties may plead and conduct their
own cases personally or by counsel. 28 U.S.C. § 1654. An individual who is not an attor-
ney cannot represent his or her spouse.' Lindstrom v. Illinois, 632 F. Supp. 1535, 1537
(N.D. 11. 1986)." Crawford v. Shamrock Coal Co., No. 88-3883 (6th Cir. filed Sept. 27,
1988), dismissed (Oct. 4, 1988); Cf. Lewis v. Lenc-Smith Mfg. Co., 784 F.2d 829 (7th Cir.
1986) (per curiam) (dismissing employment discrimination appeal because consultant,
who was neither claimant nor counsel, signed the notice of appeal).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
52. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 664 (2d ed. 1988).
53. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 531 (1884).
FALL 19891
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it. Nor has a better way been found for generating the
feeling, so important to a popular government, that jus-
tice has been done. 4
The Supreme Court has recognized that the continued receipt
of governmental benefits is an interest protected by the fifth
amendment guarantee against deprivation without due process."
In so holding, the Court has implied that a prerequisite of main-
taining an action for a violation of procedural due process in an
entitlement case is the "present enjoyment" of that entitle-
ment.56 The Court noted in Board of Regents v. Roth that "[t]he
Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a
safeguard of the security interests that a person has already ac-
quired in specific benefits.""
This restrictive view of procedural due process is unpersua-
sive, however. Justice Black, negating the logic of this perspec-
tive, pointed out that if procedural due process were not needed
in the entitlement application process, a state would be tempted
to delay putting a person on welfare until absolutely sure he or
she was eligible, because once the individual started receiving
welfare payments, the payments could not be discontinued with-
out a hearing."8 That logic is sound. As Professor Tribe has
noted, "it would be inconsistent with any intelligible rationale
underlying due process protection to deny all procedural safe-
guards to the new applicant where the law provides that all indi-
viduals meeting certain objective criteria are entitled to, say,
welfare." '5
9
B. The Principles of Due Process Applied to Black Lung
Claims
Because it is likely that procedural due process applies to an
application for benefits, 0 the next step is to determine whether
54. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
55. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970).
56. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1977); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 52,
at 690; Comment, Entitlement, Enjoyment and Due Process of Law, 1974 DUKE L. J. 89.
57. Roth, 408 U.S. at 576 (emphasis added).
58. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 279 (Black, J., dissenting).
59. L. TRIBE, supra note 52, at 690 & n.37.
60. It is important to point out that not all of the black lung appeals that are subject
to the problems detailed in this Article are the product of an initial application for bene-
fits. In some cases, the claimants received benefits for a period of time, and then OWCP
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the black lung appeals process, as presently constituted, accords
with the general principles of procedural due process. In the
1976 case of Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court set forth
three factors to balance in determining whether a procedural
due process violation has taken place in a given case." Those
factors are: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the
official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3)
the Government's interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administration burdens that the additional or sub-
stitute procedural requirement would entail.6 2
The first prong of the Mathews test focuses on the degree of
the private interest that will be affected by the official action. 3
In black lung claims, the private interest is manifestly impor-
tant. To qualify, black lung claimants must be totally disabled. 4
Most petitioners are undereducated and untrained and hence
can only earn a living in labor-intensive occupations. Unfortu-
nately, because of their disability, those types of jobs are not
open to them. Thus, the black lung benefits are frequently their
sole source of support.
The second Mathews factor is the risk of an erroneous depri-
vation of a private interest through the procedures used and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards. 5 Under the present appeals process, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation in pneumoconiosis appeals is high. Many
of the appeals satisfy the substantive statutory criteria for valid
claims, yet courts dismiss and terminate appeals because of un-
publicized procedural defects.66 These defects can be substan-
tially cured through the implementation of the substitute proce-
dural safeguards discussed in Part III of this Article.
The third and final Mathews factor to be balanced in ascer-
taining the constitutionality of the black lung claims appeals
process is the government's interest, taking into account the
function involved and the fiscal or administrative burdens that
cut them off. See, e.g., Torok v. OWCP, No. 88-3781 (6th Cir. filed Aug. 29, 1988), dis-
missed (Oct. 21, 1988) (benefits cut off after five years' receipt). Such a situation would
clearly require the application of standard due process principles, even if the Roth lan-
guage were read restrictively, so as to apply only to "present enjoyment" situations.
61. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
62. Id. at 335.
63. Id.
64. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
65. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
66. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
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the additional or substitute procedural requirements would en-
tail. In black lung appeals, the solutions described in Part III
would not unduly burden the government's fiscal or administra-
tive interests. The cost of implementation would be negligible.
This analysis demonstrates that, under the three-prong Ma-
thews analysis, the black lung appeals process violates claim-
ants' procedural due process rights. Substantial private interests
are lost through current procedures that the government can
easily reform.
C. The Restriction of Claimants' Rights to Appear Pro Se
In addition to the violation of claimants' constitutional rights
of procedural due process, the statutory right to appear pro se is
also violated by the present system. The judiciary has long rec-
ognized the rights of a party to proceed pro se.6 8 As Lord Coke
noted in 1644, "any person that is to make any claim may the
first day of eire [Circuit Court] either make it in person or by
atturny." 9 The patriot Thomas Paine noted in 1777:
[Elither party .. .has a natural right to plead his own
cause; the right is consistent with safety, therefore it is
retained; but the parties may not be able, . . . therefore
the civil right of pleading by proxy, that is, by a council,
is an appendage to the Natural right [of self-
representation]. °
Federal courts generally accept the spirit expressed in the
words of Coke and Paine to mean that pro se civil pleadings
67. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
68. This Article is not an overview of the history and implications of pro se represen-
tation in our legal system. For more detailed discussions see Zeigler & Hermann, The
Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 157 (1972); Note, An Extension of the Right of Access: The Pro Se Litigant's Right
to Notification of the Requirements of the Summary Judgment Rule, 55 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1109 (1987) (authored by Joseph M. McLaughlin); Note, Legal Education for the
Pro Se Litigant: A Step Towards a Meaningful Right To Be Heard, 96 YALE L.J. 1641
(1987) (authored by Helen B. Kim).
69. COKE'S INSTITUTES, Fourth, 296 (1644) (London 1797).
70. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 830 n.39 (1975) (emphasis added) (quoting T.
PAINE, ON A BILL OF RIGHTS, 1777, (reprinted in 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 316 (1971)). See generally Kauper, The Higher Law and the
Rights of Man in a Revolutionary Society, 18 U. MICH. L. QUADRANGLE NOTES, Winter
1974, at 8 (Available in University of Michigan Law School Library).
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should be, at a minimum, "liberally construed."71 The Supreme
Court stated, in Haines v. Kerner,72 for example, that pro se
complaints are held to "less stringent standards than pleadings
drafted by lawyers." ' 3 Indeed, sore circuits have greatly broad-
ened the implications of Haines. As the Second Circuit noted in
Traguth v. Zuck,74 "[i]mplicit in the right to self-representation
is an obligation on the part of the court to make reasonable al-
lowances to protect pro se litigants from inadvertent forfeiture
of important rights because of their lack of legal training. ' '17
Unfortunately, in black lung appeals, claimants are forfeiting
important rights because of "their lack of legal training." The
common law right to self-representation and extra latitude in
pleadings, like the historical platitudes of Coke and Paine, mean
little to aggrieved claimants. A claimant, uninformed about the
methodology of filing a proper appeal, is effectively foreclosed
from exercising his common law right to self-representation.
In addition to the common law right to appear pro se and
have pleadings construed liberally, a federal statute provides for
the right to self-representation.76 It states, "in all courts of the
United States the parties may plead and conduct their own
cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts,
respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct cases
therein."7 7 The statute represents a codification of the sixth
amendment's guarantee of a right to counsel, including the right
to appear pro se.78 The statute's roots extend back at least to
1824, when Chief Justice John Marshall wrote for the Court:
71. See, e.g., Turner v. American Bar Ass'n, 407 F. Supp. 451, 472 (N.D. Tex. 1975);
see also Kelly v. Butler County Bd. of Comm'rs, 399 F.2d 133, 134 (3d Cir. 1968) (vacat-
ing lower court's dismissal of complaint which lacked detail in the pleadings; pro se
plaintiff "was untutored in legal niceties"); Weaver v. Pate, 390 F.2d 145, 147 (7th Cir.
1968).
72. 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
73. Id. at 520.
74. 710 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1983).
75. Id. at 95.
76. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1982).
77. Id.
78. Turner v. American Bar Ass'n, 407 F. Supp. 451, 477 (N.D. Tex. 1975) ("This
Court . . . concludes that 28 U.S.C.A. § 1654, . . . was enacted to enforce the Sixth
Amendment's guarantees to right to counsel .. "); see also Elmore v. McCamron, 640
F. Supp. 905, 911 (S.D. Tex. 1986) ("To be certain, the right to file a lawsuit pro se is
one of the most important rights under our Constitution and laws."); Phillips v. Tobin,
548 F.2d 408, 411 (2d Cir. 1976) (recognizing the "long established principle that in the
federal Courts the parties have the right to plead and conduct their own cases .... ").
But see Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1172 (1986) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 1654 confers only a statutory, not a constitu-
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"[n]atural persons may appear in court, either by themselves or
by their attorney." 9
By failing to instruct pro se litigants"° in the methodology of
black lung appeals, the BRB is denying claimants' common law
and statutory rights to informed self-representation. The impact
of these violations upon the right to appeal the denial of benefits
on a pro se basis, combined with the transgressions against
claimants' due process rights,8' warrants an immediate solution.
III. Two SOLUTIONS TO THE PNEUMOCONIosIs APPEAL DILEMMA
A. The BRB Must Adopt a Standardized Notice Form
A standard "appeal information form," similar to that pro-
vided in social security benefits cases, would be the easiest solu-
tion administratively. As in social security cases, the form could
be stapled to the BRB's decision and mailed to the claimant.
Thus, petitioners would at least "know the rules" by which the
appellate process is run. In addition, this form would satisfy the
fiscal and administrative concerns of the third prong of the Ma-
tional right to self-representation in civil cases.)
It is well settled, of course, that the right to proceed pro se in a criminal proceeding is
a constitutional right. See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); Meeks v. Cra-
ven, 482 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1973); Bayless v. United States, 381 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1967).
79. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738, 829 (1824).
80. In other contexts, courts often go to heroic ends to protect the pro se party. In
United States v. Sacca, for example, the Second Circuit commended the trial judge for
warning the party about the rules of law and evidence, and telling him to refrain from
using the first person as if he were testifying when questioning witnesses. 563 F.2d 552
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1977). Courts have also held that pro se
litigants must be given special notice of their rights and responsibilities when the plead-
ing or procedure in question is "contrary to lay intuition" and dismissal will result if the
party fails to respond. See Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100, 102 (7th Cir. 1982). Courts
have extended this analysis to cases involving service of process, status calls, and mo-
tions to dismiss. Borzeka v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1984) (service of process);
Mitchell v. Inman, 682 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1982) (motion to dismiss); Camps v. C. & P.
Tel. Co., 692 F.2d 120, 124-25 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (status call). See also Note, Procedural
Due Process Rights of Pro Se Civil Litigants, 55 U. CHi. L. REV. 659, 672-75 & n.68
(1988) (authored by Julie Bradlow).
81. One commentator has collapsed the three-prong Matthews procedural due pro-
cess balancing test and the constitutional and common law pro se guarantees into a sin-
gle test. In support of the right to proceed on a pro se basis in civil cases, she calls for "a
particularized due process balancing test to determine the procedural leniency due a pro
se litigant in federal court." Note, supra note 80, at 675. Under that standard, the black
lung claimant is due even more leniency from the federal court system. As Bradlow
notes, "the pro se civil litigant's lack of knowledge will retain its rightful place as a
'shield' for him, and not become a 'sword' for the court to use to deter him." Id. at 683.
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thews 82 test, because the adoption of the form would save time,
money, and administrative inconvenience by reducing the
amount of improperly filed appeals that presently need re-rout-
ing. The suggested form would read as follows:
NOTICE OF DECISION-DENIAL
PLEASE READ CAREFULLY
The enclosed decision rendered by the Benefits Review Board
becomes final sixty (60) days after the date of the decision, un-
less a written petition for review is filed with the appropriate
United States court of appeals prior to the expiration of the
sixty (60) day period, or unless a timely request for reconsidera-
tion is filed with the Board within 30 days. 33 U.S.C. § 921(c);
30 U.S.C. § 932(a); 20 C.F.R. §§ 802.406, 802.407.
Any party who wishes to request reconsideration by the Board
must file a motion for reconsideration with the Board within
thirty (30) days of the issuance of the board's decision. The mo-
tion for reconsideration must conform to 20 C.F.R. § 802.407B,
a copy of which is attached. A timely request for reconsideration
suspends the time for filing a petition for review to the U.S.
court of appeals until a decision is made by the Board on the
request of consideration. 20 C.F.R. § 802.406.
Any party who wishes to request review by the United States
court of appeals must file a petition for review. A petition for
review should include, at a minimum, the party or parties taking
the appeal, the judgment or order appealed from, and the court
to which the appeal is taken, as well as the SIGNATURE OF THE
CLAIMANT. The petition for review must be sent directly to the
appropriate court of appeals, NOT THE BOARD. (See attached list
of Court of Appeals addresses). The state in which the injury
occurred will determine which court of appeals has jurisdiction
of the case. In a black lung claim, any place in which there was
coal mine employment is considered the state in which the in-
jury occurred. The petition for review must be received by the
United States court of appeals within sixty (60) days of the
Board's decision. 33 U.S.C. § 921(c); 20 C.F.R. § 802.406.
82. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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Parties may plead and conduct their own case personally or by
counsel. 28 U.S.C. § 1654. The petition must be signed by the
named claimant or his attorney. A spouse, child or friend of the
claimant cannot sign the petition on behalf of the claimant un-
less such person has been appointed by a court as the personal
representative of the claimant or the claimant's estate. The fail-
ure of a claimant to sign the petition will result in dismissal of
the appeal.
B. Application of the Doctrine of Constructive Filing
A second and admittedly more complex solution would be to
apply the doctrine of "constructive filing" to the pneumoconiosis
claims process. The doctrine of "constructive filing," based in
part on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60,3 takes a common
sense approach to the kinds of procedural defects described in
this Article.
Papers and pleadings are generally considered filed when the
clerk of the court receives them.84 The clerk's possession of the
papers may be actual or constructive.5  Under the constructive
filing doctrine, failure to satisfy a minor procedural requirement
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 60 reads in pertinent part:
RULE 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER
(A) CLERICAL MISTAKES
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors
therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any
time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if
any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may
be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereaf-
ter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate
court.
(B) MISTAKES; INADVERTENCE; EXCUSABLE NEGLECT; NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE;
FRAUD, ETC.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a
party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discov-
ered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether hereto-
fore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct
of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satis-
fied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment.
84. 4A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1153 (1969).
85. United States v. Dae Rim Fishery Co., 794 F.2d 1392, 1395 (9th Cir. 1986).
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will not always vitiate an otherwise valid appeal.8" If, for exam-
ple, a notice of appeal is sent to the BRB instead of a United
States court of appeals, the date that the Board receives the no-
tice can be considered the date of filing. 7 Similarly, in the case
of an appeal sent without the claimant's signature, the date of
the initial receipt would be judged the date of filing for purposes
of the appeals process, and the claimant would have a specified
period, perhaps fourteen days, to return the petition with the
correct signature. As a result, application of the doctrine of con-
structive filing would preserve a pneumoconiosis claimant's right
of appeal and would alleviate the procedural due process and
pro se defects inherent in the status quo.
IV. CONCLUSION
The poet Sir Owen Seaman wrote, in the early part of this
century:
Ye that have faith to look with fearless eyes
Beyond the tragedy of a world at strife,
86. See, e.g., Parissi v. Telechron, Inc., 349 U.S. 46 (1955) (failure of appellant to
include $5.00 filing fee did not vitiate appeal); Cintron v. Union Pacific R.R., 813 F.2d
917 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that appellant's failure to punch two holes at the top of the
complaint, provide a copy of the civil cover sheet, and send a check for the proper filing
fee, was not enough to vitiate appeal); Lyons v. Goodson, 787 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1986)
(holding that pro se complaint considered filed when sent to court, even if deficient in
one or more required elements); Loya v. Desert Sands Unified School Dist., 721 F.2d 279
(9th Cir. 1983) (holding that submission of complaint on wrong size paper, and passing
of the 90-day appeal period before error was corrected was not enough to vitiate appeal);
Brown v. City of Meridian, 356 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding that failure to comply
with local rule was not grounds for dismissal); Woodham v. American Cystoscope Co. 335
F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1964) (also holding that failure to comply with local rule was not
grounds for dismissal).
87. The doctrine of constructive filing in this context came under the scrutiny of the
Supreme Court in the 1988 Term. The Court granted certiorari to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Houston v. Lack, 819 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1987), and
reversed. Houston concerned the pro se petition of a prisoner that was denied air mail
delivery by the warden because the prisoner lacked sufficient funds. The Sixth Circuit
dismissed the appeal as untimely without a published opinion. The Supreme Court, in
reversing, limited its decision to prisoners' pleadings. Henceforth, any prisoner's pleading
is deemed "filed" when it is delivered to the warden for mailing. Houston v. Lack, 108 S.
Ct. 2379 (1988).
It remains to be seen if the Houston opinion will have any effect in black lung litiga-
tion in the Sixth Circuit. The court, as demonstrated by its dismissal of Houston, is
intolerant of procedural shortcomings in pro se cases. This includes black lung appeals.
See e.g., Danko v. OWCP, 846 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Boiling v. OWCP,
823 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating that the court would not accept the date a petition
of review was received by the BRB as the date of filing).
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And trust that out of night and death shall rise
The dawn of ampler life;
Rejoice, whatever anguish rend your heart,
To live in these great times and have your part
In Freedom's crowning hour; ... "
Unfortunately, black lung claimants throughout the United
States are gradually losing the trust that an "ampler life" exists.
As one claimant's spouse writes:
I am sitting here at three o'clock in the morning and
wondering why am I and my husband living? They took
the Black Lung [benefits] away from his and our lively
hood [sic] yet they can give welfare and all that to other
people and took away his.
I have sent reports and all to every judge I could think of
and none want to reply-is it because they don't care to
help or what?
I think something like this should be made public be-
cause there any many more people like us in the same
situation.
I would give anything-even my life-to get on a T.V.
talk show and let them know how bad the system is. My
husband has one lung . . . After he got [the benefits] for
5 years and now they took it from him.
Please somebody do something for us poor people.89
As detailed in this Article, the black lung appeals process is
complex for the lay person, especially for the pro se claimant
who is frequently undereducated. The process, moving from the
deputy OWCP commissioner, to the ALJ, to the BRB and fi-
nally to the United States court of appeals, is a bureaucratic web
of rules and procedural regulations that trap many claimants,
forcing them to forfeit their appeals before the appellate court
has the opportunity to address the merits of their claims. This
system deprives the claimants of their constitutional right to
procedural due process, as well as their statutory and common
law right to appear in a legal proceeding pro se. Two solutions
would cure this problem. The first entails the adoption of an ap-
peal notice form, similar to that employed in social security ben-
efits cases. The second, admittedly more complex, solution ap-
88. 0. SEAMAN, Between Midnight and Morning, The Book of King Albert (1910).
89. Torok v. OWCP, No. 88-3781 (6th Cir. filed Aug. 29, 1988), dismissed (Oct. 21,
1988).
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plies the doctrine of constructive filing to black lung appeals.
That doctrine allows the preservation of appeals when the pro-
cedural difficulty is a minor one, such as a petition containing
the wrong signature. Whichever solution is adopted, action must
be taken soon. As the latest statistics in the Sixth Circuit show,
the situation has already reached crisis proportions.

